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ABSTRACT
Driving around bends at high speeds is a task performed by many on a daily basis but the underlying
mechanisms of steering control remain largely unknown. Previous research has shown that when steering,
gaze direction can be a critical component of success. However, with increased use of in-vehicle information
systems (IVIS), there is growing competition over the same resources that are needed to steer (gaze as well
as associated attentional resources). Although it can be argued that locomotor steering is an automatic task
that can be performed without recourse to conscious ‘cognitive’ control, much simpler locomotor-related
tasks, such as judging one’s heading, have been shown to be affected by concurrent attentional tasks (Wann,
Swapp, & Rushton, 2000). Here we examined whether an attentional task placed at an offset fixation point
influenced concurrent steering performance along a computer simulated road. The experiments either used
gaze-fixation points that had similar properties to real-world road signs (i.e. moved relative to the vehicle) or
were more akin to IVIS (i.e. fixed to the vehicle). Results showed that gaze fixation eccentric to future path
caused systematic steering biases. The degree or type of cognitive load did not change the degree of steering
bias, but there was some evidence of decreased lane variability when viewing the IVIS-type displays. No
differences in steering performance were found between the different types of cognitive task. We conclude
that where you look is critical for safe driving, and IVIS-type displays might make drivers more susceptible
to cognitive interference.
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Introduction
Locomotion, and driving in particular, fundamen-
tally requires the ability to control steering to negoti-
ate bends at high-speeds whilst taking appropriate
trajectories along curved roadways. The effect of
additional attentional demands imposed by activi-
ties such as cell phone use and interactions with in-
vehicle systems have often been studied in terms of
reaction times to critical events, such as braking, and
lane keeping (e.g., Strayer & Drews, 2004; Salvucci
& Beltowska, 2008; Recarte & Nunes, 2003). How-
ever, less is known about the effect of cognitive load
on steering control, and in particular whether atten-
tional demands interact with the direction of gaze
and successful steering control.
Direction of gaze has been shown to be critically
important when steering around bends (Land & Lee,
1994; Wilkie & Wann, 2003). Although these studies
propose two different models of locomotor control,
1
2 Kountouriotis, Wilkie, Gardner, & Merat (2015). Looking and Thinking when Driving
both models require the driver to look toward re-
gions of the road ahead. According to the ‘Tangent
Point’ model of steering (Land & Lee, 1994), drivers
should predominantly fixate the apex of the inside
road-edge. However, the ‘Active Gaze’ model of
steering (Wilkie & Wann, 2003; Wilkie, Wann, &
Allison, 2008) proposes a close link between the
direction of gaze and the steering trajectory taken
by drivers: under conditions of unrestrained gaze,
drivers have been found to fixate points on the road
that lie on their future path (Wilkie &Wann, 2003;
Wilkie et al., 2008; Wilkie, Kountouriotis, Merat,
& Wann, 2010). The reciprocal also seems to be
true: when gaze is forced onto points eccentric to
the required curved path, drivers alter their steering
trajectories to pass nearer to those fixation points
(Kountouriotis, Floyd, Gardner, Merat, & Wilkie,
2012). This relationship has also been observed
when maintaining a trajectory along straight roads
(Readinger, Chatziastros, Cunningham, Bülthoff, &
Cutting, 2002). At slow speeds (e.g. when walking)
decoupling gaze and steering may have little effect
on successful control, however, when driving at high
speeds in rapidly changing environments decoupling
gaze and steering is not advisable. Of course, in real
world scenarios, drivers often have to look away from
their future path to perform various tasks, e.g. to sam-
ple information from road signs or interact with an
in-vehicle satellite navigation system. These tasks
require drivers not only to look away from their fu-
ture path, but to also perform some kind of cognitive
task (e.g. read a sign or decipher a map). These con-
current tasks when driving may have an additional
effect over and above eccentric fixations, and there-
fore need to be better understood.
In experimental settings, asking participants to
perform a concurrent task whilst driving can result
in changes in the natural gaze patterns due to the
task itself, e.g. looking at the speedometer. However,
even tasks that do not rely on vision and hence do
not require participants to direct their gaze towards
a specific location (e.g. an auditory in-vehicle infor-
mation system or talking hands-free on a phone)
have been shown to affect gaze behaviours during
driving (Victor, Harbluk, & Engström, 2005). Such
tasks can increase the duration of gaze fixations to
the road centre, along with a decrease in saccades
to the periphery (Recarte & Nunes, 2003; Victor et
al., 2005). Even when gaze patterns do not change,
it appears that greater attentional load can reduce
the available resources for visual processing of the
scene. For example, Strayer, Drews, and Johnston
(2003) examined driving performance when drivers
talked on a hands-free phone. They observed that
participants were less likely to remember seeing bill-
boards in the conditions where they were conversing
on the phone compared to the control conditions,
even though there was no difference between the
two conditions in the number of fixations they made
on these objects. Strayer et al. (2003) explain this
finding in terms of relocating attention from driving
towards the phone task.
In addition to these changes in gaze patterns, cog-
nitive tasks may also change steering, with the vari-
ability of lane position reducing under cognitive load
conditions (Engström, Johansson, & Östlund, 2005;
Jamson & Merat, 2005). There is a tight coupling be-
tween gaze and steering: not only does steering guide
the direction of gaze with drivers looking where they
are going (Wilkie &Wann, 2003, 2005; Wilkie et al.,
2010) but gaze direction guides steering with drivers
steering where they look (Kountouriotis et al., 2012;
Robertshaw &Wilkie, 2008). A question that arises,
therefore, is whether increased cognitive demand af-
fects eye movements (which in turn lead to changes
in steering patterns), or whether cognitive demand
affects steering patterns (which then leads to changes
in eye movements). For example, Engström et al.
(2005) used a cognitive load condition which did not
require drivers to look at a visual display, but they
reported both greater gaze concentration around the
road centre and reduced lane keeping variation. In-
creased gaze concentration has also been shown in
other studies using non-visual distraction tasks (e.g.,
Reimer, 2009; Victor et al., 2005). One possible inter-
pretation of these findings is that the cognitive load
increased gaze concentration around the road centre,
and this in turn caused steering trajectories to pass
closer to the point of gaze (as per Wilkie & Wann,
2003; Wilkie et al., 2008, 2010).
From this evidence it is difficult to conclude
definitively that cognitive load influences steer-
ing directly (rather than via gaze mechanisms).
Cooper, Medeiros-Ward, and Strayer (2013) exam-
ined whether the reduced lateral variation in steering
under cognitive load was due to a reduction in lat-
eral eye-movements (gaze concentration). Cooper
et al. (2013) instructed drivers to look at an illumi-
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nated number plate on a vehicle ahead. The illu-
minated plate switched between 3 or 5 vehicles in
other lanes and the temporal frequency by which
drivers changed their point of gaze from one vehi-
cle to the next was varied. The low frequency gaze
changes were supposed to be similar to the patterns
exhibited during ‘gaze concentration’. This study
reported that increased cognitive load did indeed
lower steering variability even when gaze changes
were matched across ‘no cognitive load’ and ‘high
cognitive load’ conditions. They concluded that the
cognitive task caused attention to be removed from
the lane-keeping task, which due to its automaticity
improved (Medeiros-Ward, Cooper, & Strayer, 2014).
Whilst it would seem this evidence indicates that
the effects of cognitive load are independent of gaze
direction, there were some limitations to this study.
There were no trials where drivers looked solely to-
wards the road ahead, but in the condition where
gaze was predominantly directed to the road ahead
(‘‘static predictable’’) there was no reliable effect of
cognitive load. It remains unclear, therefore, whether
a cognitive load influences steering when natural
gaze behaviours are adopted and drivers fixate their
future path. A linked issue is that the non-visual na-
ture of the cognitive task does not generalise to the
common situation of retrieving and processing in-
formation from the point where you are looking (i.e.
there was no task involving information at the point
of fixation). Furthermore,Cooper et al. (2013) and
Medeiros-Ward et al. (2014) only examined the task
of maintaining a trajectory along straight roads. Al-
though this can be a useful paradigm for answering
questions related to lane-keeping, the task does not
necessarily translate to the more general (and com-
plex) case of steering curved trajectories, where the
driver needs to take into account both feedback infor-
mation from the near road edges as well as prospec-
tive information from the road ahead (Land & Hor-
wood, 1995; Salvucci & Gray, 2004).
It has to be noted though that whilst a number of
studies have shown that a reduction in lane position
variability often occurswhen cognitive load increases
(e.g., Engström et al., 2005; Kubose et al., 2006; Jam-
son & Merat, 2005; Merat, Anttila, & Luoma, 2005),
there are also conflicting results—i.e., an increase in
lane variability under conditions of cognitive load
(e.g., Drews, Pasupathi, & Strayer, 2008; Salvucci &
Beltowska, 2008). These contradictory findings may
be because of differences in task difficulty between
various experiments, as well as the specific driving
task and scenarios used1. Moreover, most of these
studies did not specifically examine the task of bend
negotiation, which requires continuous online steer-
ing control (as opposed to lane keeping in straight
roads, where the drivers only need to correct their
steering when they have drifted too much towards
one side of the lane). Most importantly, however,
not all of these studies provide information about
where participants were looking during lane keeping,
making interpretation of the findings difficult.
The evidence introduced so far suggests that sec-
ondary tasks can affect eye-movements either di-
rectly by requiring participants to look at an in-
vehicle display (IVIS), indirectly by inducing gaze
concentration at the centre of the road, or the sec-
ondary tasks can reduce overall the processing of
the visual scene. The reason why a secondary task
would affect the processing of the scene is not fully
understood yet, but one explanation could be the
narrowing of the Useful Field of View (UFOV: Ball,
Beard, Roenker, Miller, & Griggs, 1988). The visual
area where information can be sampled with one fix-
ation has been named the functional field of view
(FFoV), or the useful field of view (Ball et al., 1988).
A property of the UFOV is that its size is not con-
stant but instead can decrease in the presence of a
cognitive load on the central point of fixation, thus
creating artificial tunnel vision (Williams, 1982, 1985).
Whilst tunnel vision has been shown in laboratory
settings, it is not necessarily the reason for the poor
peripheral detection performance during secondary
tasks (e.g., Merat & Jamson, 2008). For example, the
‘general interference theory’ states that secondary
tasks are sometimes allocated more attentional re-
sources and this causes a concomitant decline in
the performance of other concurrent detection tasks
(Recarte & Nunes, 2003). In this case, therefore, an
increased cognitive load would decrease detection
performance in the entire visual field, not just for
targets presented in peripheral vision (see Victor, En-
gström, & Harbluk, 2008).
The research evidence seems to indicate that in or-
1Tasks using different cognitive resources have been postu-
lated to have different effects on steering. Engström et al. (2005)
found an increase in lane keeping variation when using a visually
demanding task compared to a more cognitive task. However, it
should be noted that eye-movements rather than the task itself
might have influenced the steering findings.
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der to determine whether cognitive load influences
steering, one needs to control gaze direction and eye
movements. This can be achieved by enforcing gaze
fixation on specific points in the scene, during single
task steering, as well as dual task conditions (steering
plus cognitive load). When participants are asked to
carry out a cognitive task whilst steering, predictions
can be made regarding the effect that such a concur-
rent task will have on steering: (a) indirectly through
affecting vision which in turn affects steering per-
formance, and (b) directly, by affecting the control
processes underpinning steering itself. In terms of
(a) it has been shown that when the boundaries of
the road (i.e., the road-edges) are either visually de-
graded (Kountouriotis et al., 2012) or moved towards
peripheral vision (Robertshaw &Wilkie, 2008), then
gaze direction has a greater influence on steering tra-
jectories, with participants exhibiting a greater bias
towards offset fixation points. In Kountouriotis et al.
(2012) when the road-edges were degraded steering
bias towards the fixation points increased (i.e. gaze
direction had a greater input into steering than then
degraded sources of information. The greater influ-
ence of gaze direction has been explained in terms of
the Active Gaze model, which combines a number of
flexibly weighted perceptual inputs: when one of the
inputs (i.e. the road-edges) becomes noisy/unreliable
or unavailable, the weighting is increased for other
inputs (i.e. gaze direction; Kountouriotis et al., 2012;
Wilkie et al., 2008; Wilkie & Wann, 2002). An in-
creased influence of gaze on steering could also, in
theory, be induced without making any physical
changes to road-edge luminance or road width, but
by asking the drivers to carry out a cognitive or visual
task, which would reduce the Useful Field of View
(UFOV) and thus degrade the information provided
by these features (Figure 4). As such, in a steering
task when there is a visual or cognitive load on the
point of gaze fixation, if visual information from
peripheral vision becomes degraded (i.e., reduced
UFOV), then greater steering bias towards the fixa-
tion point should be observed.
In terms of scenario (b) – cognitive load affecting
steering directly – steering is often viewed as highly
automated, without awareness of its procedural as-
pect and not relying on limited resources (Norman
& Shallice, 2000; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). If this
is the case, steering should not be subject to interfer-
ence from higher-level functions such as cognitive
tasks, unless these tasks either affect eye-movements
(which have been shown to be crucial for locomo-
tion) or require amotor response (where there would
be biomechanical interference with the steering task).
There is evidence, however that shows that visual-
motor tasks, such as walking (Harley, Wilkie, &
Wann, 2009) and judging one’s direction of head-
ing (Wann et al., 2000) can be affected by concurrent
cognitive tasks. In the experiments reported here
we examined whether the differences in steering pat-
terns observed in the literature when drivers engage
in visuospatial tasks and tasks that do not require vi-
sual input (‘cognitive’ tasks) can be attributed to dif-
ferences in eye-movements as the Active Gazemodel
of steering predicts. To this purpose, tasks similar to
those used by Wann et al. (2000) that affected head-
ing estimation were used, the rationale being that
since these tasks can affect a low-level task such as
heading perception, they should affect steering too.
(Wann et al., 2000) simulated linear self-motion and
asked participants to perform one of three concur-
rent tasks (‘Arrow’, ‘Number’ and ‘Colour’). They
found that two tasks (‘Arrow’ and ‘Number’) had a
detrimental effect on participants’ ability to judge the
direction of simulated self-motion, with participants
under-estimating the eccentricity of their heading
direction. We used similar tasks, as well as an ad-
ditional auditory task (in Experiment 2) in order
to have a condition where attentional focus did not
coincide with gaze focus.
In the first experiment reported here visual tasks
were placed at fixation points at a constant angle rel-
ative to the driver (similar to looking at an IVIS; as
used by Readinger et al., 2002) and in the second
experiment the fixation points were positioned in
relation to the world at a fixed distance from the
driver (as in Kountouriotis et al., 2012; Robertshaw
&Wilkie, 2008). The same fixation points were used
in baseline conditions (without additional cognitive
load) as well as in the cognitive task conditions, allow-
ing the impact of cognitive load and gaze direction
on steering to be quantified.
Experiment 1: Fixations relative to
the vehicle (‘IVIS’)
In the first experiment participants steered a series
of bends whilst directing their gaze on to a fixation
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cross displayed in one of four possible eccentricities.
The fixation point was always at a constant angle
to driver, mimicking the properties of an in-vehicle
information system. In the baseline conditions par-
ticipants were asked to simply steer while fixating
their gaze on the fixation point, while in the task con-
ditions they had to perform one of two tasks (judge
the direction of arrows or a number series).
Methods
Participants
Fourteen volunteers took part in this study, eight of
them were females. The mean age was 23.93 ± 4.86
years and all had a driving license (one participant
held a learner’s licence at the time of testing). All
of the participants were naïve to the purpose of the
experiment.
Apparatus
A PC with Intel i7 950 (3.07 GHz) processor gener-
ated images at 60 Hz with a resolution of 1280× 1024
pixels. Images were created using WorldViz Vizard
3.0. Images were projected using a Sanyo Liquid
Crystal Projector (PLC-XU58) onto a back projec-
tion screen with dimensions of 1.98 × 1.43 m. Par-
ticipants sat 1 m away from this screen, making the
total field of view 89.42○×71.31○. A height-adjustable
racing-style driving seat was used to maintain eye-
height 1.20 m above the ground. Participants sat in a
matt black booth so that the projection provided the
only source of light. Steering was controlled using
a force-feedback wheel (Logitech G27). Gaze data
were recorded using a remote Applied Science Lab-
oratories 504 gaze monitoring system, which uses
pan-tilt tracking to follow eye movements and was
calibrated on a 9-point grid.
Visual Stimuli
The environment consisted of a 3 m wide bending
roadway and participants were instructed to steer
along the centre of the road. The road consisted of a
9 m long straight section and after that a single bend.
The road curvature started at 60 m but it reduced at
a constant rate of change of −25/π m. This type of
bend was used over bends with a constant curvature,
where (in theory) participants can steer by keeping
the steering wheel at a constant angle. This should
make the steering taskmore demanding by requiring
participants to constantly monitor that the turning
rate is sufficient. Figure 1 shows a top-down view of
the bends used here, compared to a bend of constant
curvature for comparison. In half the trials bends
were flipped across the long axis tomake bends curve
to the right or the left. The speedwas kept constant in
all of the conditions at 13.8 m/s to avoid participants
negating the difficulty of the steering task by slowing
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Figure 1 Example of a spiral bend (where the radius re-
duces at a constant rate) compared to a bend of constant
curvature.
The fixations used in this experiment were at a con-
stant angle from the driver irrespective of the scene
in order to imitate the properties of in-vehicle infor-
mation systems, such as the position of a satellite
navigation system on a windscreen.
Four different eccentricities were used, set at 20°
or 30° from the driver’s midline, either at the same
direction of the bend (named Inside and Far Inside
respectively), or opposite to the direction of the bend
(named Outside and Far Outside respectively). For
example, in a right bend, the fixation point located
at 20° to the right of the participant would be the
Inside fixation whereas the fixation pointed located
20° to the left of the participant would be the Out-
side fixation. Figure 2 shows the scene with all four
fixation points (only one fixation was visible during
each trial).
Fixations with a constant offset angle from the
driver were also used by Readinger et al. (2002). In
their study, participants steered towards the fixation
points when driving along a straight road, with the
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Figure 2 The four possible fixation points in Experiment
1 were always at the same offset angle (20 or 30 degrees
in either direction) relative to the driver’s midline. Only
one fixation was visible during each trial. The insert shows
an example sequence for the ‘Arrow’ condition, where
the correct response (after locomotion finishes) would be
‘clockwise’ (right button press). The same timings were
used in all task conditions.
magnitude of bias generally being in proportion to
themagnitude of the offset of the fixation point. How-
ever, bias reached a plateau on the more extreme off-
set fixations (not used here). If similar results are
observed in this experiment, then systematic neg-
ative biases for Far Outside and Outside fixations
are expected, and positive biases for the Inside and
Far Inside fixations. Furthermore, the magnitude of
these biases should reflect the offset of the fixations:
larger (positive) values for the Far Inside compared
to the Inside fixation, and larger (absolute) values for
the Far Outside compared to the Outside fixations.
Cognitive Tasks
Two cognitive tasks were used in this experiment,
‘Arrow’ and ‘Number’, as well as a control condition,
during which the participants were asked to keep
their gaze fixating the target throughout the trial. The
cognitive task conditions presented information on
the fixation target which were similar to the Arrow
and Number conditions used by Wann et al. (2000).
Here, however, instead of asking the participant to
report the next arrow or number in a series, as in
Wann et al. (2000), the participants were asked to
compare either two arrows (Arrow condition) or two
numbers (Number condition) presented at different
times during the trial and make a judgement about
the two stimuli. The onset of the first stimulus was
two seconds into the trial, and the onset of the second
stimulus was six seconds into the trial. Each stimulus
was visible for one second. When no arrow or num-
ber was present the fixation point displayed a cross.
At the end of the trial participants reported whether
the numbers ascended or descended, or whether the
arrows were moving clockwise or anticlockwise. The
responses were made by pressing the right paddle of
the steering wheel for ascending or clockwise and the
left paddle for descending and anticlockwise. Partici-
pants were allowed to practice the tasks until they felt
comfortable performing them whilst steering. The
insert of Figure 2 shows the timings of an example
Arrow condition.
Since participants had to wait until the end of the
trial to make a response, reaction times do not act as
a useful measure in these experiments. In order to
get an estimate of the relative difficulty of each task
we measured separately reaction times and accuracy
rates to respond purely to the visual stimuli (using
the same display timings as in the actual experiment
but without a concurrent steering task). Accuracy
was similar across tasks, though RTs were quicker for
‘Number’ trials and slowest for ‘Arrow’ trials. The
full results of this pilot are reported in the methods
section of Experiment 2.
Experimental Design and Analysis
A blocked design was used to separate the task and
no task (baseline) conditions, in order to avoid situ-
ations where in a ‘No Task’ condition participants
expect a stimulus to appear on the fixation point and
therefore allocate more attentional resources than
they would do otherwise. This provides us with a
relatively pure measure of steering when fixating the
signs without additional cognitive load. Tominimise
the confounding effects of practice and fatigue the
no-load condition was repeated twice, at both the be-
ginning and end of the testing session. Participants
completed the ‘No Task 1’ block with the control con-
ditions (6 trials of 4 fixations, half in right bends and
half in left bends). Then in the second block (‘Task’
block) they completed the two cognitive tasks ran-
domly interleaved (6 trials of 4 fixations × 3 tasks,
half of them right bends and half left). Finally, the
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‘No Task 2’ block repeated the control condition (6
trials of 4 fixations).
Results and Discussion
Cognitive Task Performance
In order to examine performance during the two
cognitive tasks, accuracy scores (i.e., the percent-
age of correct responses) were calculated. The pro-
portion of correct responses averaged across partici-
pants for the Arrow and Number tasks were 91.07%
and 93.15% respectively, indicating that the partici-
pants performed well in both tasks, and to a similar
level as when performing the tasks without steer-
ing (see Table 1, Experiment 2 for a pilot experi-
ment examining all secondary tasks without steer-
ing). A paired-samples t-test found no significant
difference between the Arrow and Number tasks,
t(13) = −1.71, p = .110.
Steering Bias
Steering bias is a directionalmeasure of steering error,
measuring the overall tendency of the driver to steer
towards the outside road edge (negative values), or
the inside road edge (positive values) relative to the
centre of the road (zero bias). A 4 (levels of Task: No
Task 1, Arrow, Number and No Task 2) by 4 (levels
of fixations: Far Inside, Inside, Outside and Far Out-
side) repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out
on the steering bias values. There was no significant
effect of Task, F(3, 39) = 1.92, p = .143, but a signif-
icant main effect of Fixation, F(3, 39) = 3.55, p =
.023, η2p = .21, and a significant interaction between
Task and Fixation, F(9, 117) = 2.41, p = .015, η2p = .16,
shown in Figure 3.
When No Task 1 is removed from the ANOVA
so that Task has only three levels and Fixation four
levels, the interaction between Fixation and Task
ceases to be significant, F(6, 78) = 1.04, p = .405.
It seems then that the interaction is driven by the
behaviour of the participants in the No Task 1 con-
dition/block where there are systematic directional
steering biases caused by fixation direction (white
triangles on Figure 3). Fixating Far Outside causes
the greatest understeer (i.e., steering towards the out-
side edge) and fixating Far Inside causes the greatest
oversteer (steering towards the inside edge) with the


































Figure 3 The interaction between Fixation and Task con-
ditions in steering bias. When participants fixate on the
Inside they steer towards the inside road edge in No Task
1 relatively to the rest of the task conditions, and they also
understeer in the Outside fixation condition compared to
the rest of the task conditions. Error bars = SEM.
direction of fixation. This is the result that would be
expected if participants steered in the direction of
gaze (Readinger et al., 2002; Robertshaw &Wilkie,
2008; Kountouriotis et al., 2012).
For all other conditions (Tasks and No Task 2) par-
ticipants did exhibit some degree of bias caused by
fixation direction. This is shown by the direction of
slopes between Far Inside and Inside fixation (Figure
3, greater oversteer in Far Inside), and Outside and
Far Outside (greater understeer in Far Outside than
Outside). However, there is a second factor influenc-
ing steering that causes participants to steer away
from the direction of gaze – this is most obvious in
the Outside and Inside fixation conditions compar-
ing No Task 2 with No Task 1 (Figure 3, white squares
vs. white triangles).
We believe that this steering bias is due to a prop-
erty of the static fixation points used. If the driver
steers in the opposite direction of fixation then this
causes a change in the scene and makes the centre of
the road lie closer to the point of gaze. This means
that the road will fall closer to central vision and
so may provide more useful information to partici-
pants (Figure 4 illustrates this effect). The fact that
this behaviour is not exhibited in the No Task 1 block
(whichwas always presented first) indicates that steer-
ing away from gaze may be a learnt response to try to
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reduce the biases caused by eccentric fixation. It ap-
pears therefore that participants learnt to alter their
natural steering behaviour in order to ‘move’ the
road towards their point of gaze. This demonstrates
remarkable flexibility in the coordination of gaze and
steering.
Figure 4Over/under-steering and the relation of the fix-
ation point to the road. (a) Steering away from the point
of gaze means that the road is closer to central vision (see
shaded circle). (b) Steering towards the point of gazemoves
the road towards peripheral vision where not only there is
less visual acuity but the gaze angle hasn’t been reduced.
The dark grey discs demonstrate a ~30° zone indicating
central vision (these discs were not visible to the partici-
pants).
It was expected that due to a narrowing of the
UFOV (Ball et al., 1988; Williams, 1982, 1985) partic-
ipants’ steering would be influenced more by gaze
direction (with participants exhibiting greater biases
towards the fixation points) when a concurrent task
was present compared to the No Task conditions.
There were, however, no differential effects of cogni-
tive task on steering bias.
RMS Steering Error
RMS error is calculated by taking the square of the
signed steering error (bias) for every frame, averag-
ing across frames and then taking the square root. It
provides an overall estimate of how close the partici-
pant was to the centre of the road in a given trial
but is unsigned (in contrast to bias which shows
whether there was systematic over/understeer but
underestimate large errors that are not biased). Low
RMS scores indicate participants stayed near the cen-
tre of the road whereas high values indicate partic-
ipants were away from the centre. As with steering
bias, a 4 (levels of Task) by 4 (Fixations) repeated-
measures ANOVA was carried out on the RMS val-
ues. There was a significant main effect of Task con-
ditions, F(3, 39) = 14.10, p < .001, η2p = .52, as well
as a significant main effect of Fixation conditions,
F(3, 39) = 8.31, p < .001, η2p = .39. No significant
interaction was found between these two factors,
F(4.23, 55.01) = 0.47, p = .764.
The main effect of Fixation is shown in Figure 5a.
Repeated planned contrasts indicate that RMS er-
ror in the Inside fixation condition was significantly
lower both from the Far Inside fixation, F(1, 13) =
23.41, p < .001, and the Outside fixation condi-
tion, F(1, 13) = 10.94, p = .006. No difference was
found between theOutside and Far Outside fixations,
F(1, 13) = 1.96, p = .185. The lower RMS error in the
Inside fixation condition is in line with the findings
of Kountouriotis et al. (2012), where fixation on the
inside of the bend produced lower RMS scores than
fixation on the outside of the bend. It appears, how-
ever, that the advantage of fixating on the inside of
the bend is lost when the fixation is moved further
away from the road centre (Far Inside fixation).
The main effect of Task on RMS error is shown
in Figure 5b. We first compared the two task condi-
tions using a t-test which showed no difference be-
tween the two, t(13) = .62, p = .55. Therefore we col-
lapsed these two conditions and ran a 3-way ANOVA
comparing No Task 1, Tasks, and No Task 2 which
was significant, F(2, 26) = 12.66, p < .001, η2p = .49.
Pairwise comparisons with Sidak correction showed
that No Task 1 was significantly higher than Tasks
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Figure 5 RMS steering error. (a) The main effect of Fixa-
tion. Participants perform better when they fixate on the
inside of the bend, but this advantage of the inside fixation
does not exist on the more extreme Far Inside fixation.
(b) The main effect of Task. Participants’ RMS errors are
lower when they perform a secondary task (either Arrow
or Number) compared to the conditions where there is no
concurrent task. Error bars = SEM.
(p < .001), No Task 2 was significantly higher than
Tasks (p = .034) but there were no differences be-
tween No Task 1 and No Task 2 (p = .276).
An interesting phenomenon occurs here: RMS
scores, usually indicative of steering error and vari-
ability in steering performance, are higher when
participants do not perform a secondary task. As
discussed in the Introduction, this finding can be
explained by previous research. One measure that
might help interpret the present findings is steering
reversal rate (McLean & Hoffmann, 1975).
Steering Reversals
If RMS error reflects reduced steering variability
in the tasks conditions compared to baseline then
we should see the same pattern when using a mea-
sure such as steering reversals. Steering reversal rate
can be defined as the number of times per minute
that the direction of the steering wheel changes by
a finite amount – from half a degree to 10 degrees
(McLean & Hoffmann, 1975; Macdonald & Hoff-
mann, 1980). In our experiment trials only lasted
for a relatively short duration (7 s), so we gener-
ated a measure of steering reversals using the rate
of change of the steering wheel angle and then iden-
tifying any peaks above 1° in the opposite direction
of the required steering response. We used these
criteria in order to capture instances where partic-
ipants needed to make major adjustments to their
trajectory rather than capturing overall steering in-
put (though bidirectional reversals of 0.5° and 0.1°
revealed similar patterns as in the reported metric).
Similar to the analysis of RMS steering error, a t-test
was carried out to compare the difference in number
of steering reversals (see Figure 6) between Number
and Arrow, which showed no significant difference,
t(13) = −.56, p = .588. Therefore we collapsed across
the tasks conditions and ran a repeated-measures
ANOVA with one factor with 3 levels (No Task 1,
Tasks, No Task 2). There was a significant main
effect, F(2, 16) = 17.61, p < .001, η2p = .575. Pair-
wise comparisons with Sidak corrections showed
that differences were significant between all three
conditions. Participants in the No Task 1 condition
made more steering reversals compared to the Tasks
condition (p < .001), and alsomore steering reversals
compared to No Task 2 (p = .027). Additionally, in
No Task 2 participants made more steering reversals





























Figure 6Number of steering wheel reversals for each Task
condition. Participants perform fewer steering reversals
when there is a secondary task compared to the conditions
without a concurrent task. Error bars = SEM.
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When participants had a cognitive load theymade
fewer steering reversals compared to the conditions
without a cognitive load. This finding is in line with
the observations ofMacdonald andHoffmann (1980)
who suggested that increasing the demands on a
steering task with a cognitive load causes a reduc-
tion in steering reversals; they argue that this hap-
pens because when participants have to perform a
demanding concurrent task they remove their at-
tention from the steering task and therefore make
fewer corrective adjustments. The alternative expla-
nation is that steering performance is actually im-
proving when attention is shifted away, because steer-
ing is such a highly-automated task (Medeiros-Ward
et al., 2014). This argument equates reduced variabil-
ity with better performance, but this relationship is
commonly observed in experts performing a num-
ber of skilled visual-motor tasks, for example base-
ball (Gray, 2004), golf and football (Beilock, Carr,
MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002) as well as typing (Tapp
& Logan, 2011).
Experiment 2: Fixations in rela-
tion to the world (‘Road Signs’)
The first experiment showed that fixations on signs
at a constant angle relative to the observer led to
reduced steering corrections in the task conditions.
In terms of directional errors (steering bias), partic-
ipants steered in the direction of gaze in the first
experimental block, but in the following blocks they
steered in a way that would bring relevant informa-
tion closer to central vision. In the second experi-
ment the fixation points were positioned in theworld,
and their position updated every frame so they were
always at a fixed distance ahead of the observer. Ad-
ditionally, being positioned in the world they created
a gaze angle that could be reduced if the participant
steered towards them (see Kountouriotis et al., 2012;
Robertshaw & Wilkie, 2008). This means that par-
ticipants could close down the angle between their
mid-line and gaze direction. These fixation points
have similar properties to road signs, in that drivers
can reduce their gaze angle by steering towards them
(although unlike real signs these fixation points were
always kept a set distance away and were always per-
pendicular to the observer to ensure clear and con-
sistent visibility of the sign).
In Experiment 2 we also decided to employ an ad-
ditional task: participants looked at the same fixation
points, but were asked to evaluate auditory informa-
tion rather than visual information (‘Sound’ task).
The formof the taskwas similar to the visual task: par-
ticipants heard two sounds of different frequencies
and after trials finished they had to indicate whether
the second sound had a lower or higher frequency
than the first (using left or right button presses). The
rationale for using this task was that the Number
and Arrow tasks should draw attention to the fixa-
tion point, but the Sound task should not. Therefore,
according to the UFOV theory, no narrowing of the
visual field should be observed in the Sound task,
which would make participants less likely to exhibit
large steering biases towards the point of fixation.
In order to accommodate fixations located at the
centre of the road, the road width was increased by
1 m (4 m wide, compared to 3 m wide in Experi-
ment 1). This increase in road width should allow for
higher RMS/steering variability errors, which could
differentiate between the different cognitive tasks
(something Experiment 1 did not show and could
have been due to the relatively narrow roads used).
Methods
Participants
Twelve participants took part in this study (six fe-
males) with a mean age of 20.5 ± 0.79 years. Ten
participants held a valid driving license at the time
of testing. The two non-drivers did not perform dif-
ferently from the drivers2. All of the participants
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment.
Apparatus
The same apparatus was used as in Experiment 1.
Visual Stimuli
The same bends as Experiment 1 were used, with the
only difference being that the roads were 4 m wide
(instead of 3 m wide in Experiment 1) in order to
accommodate for the different fixation points used
here.
2We re-ran all analyses excluding the participants without
a driving licence, but this had no effect on the pattern of the
statistical results.
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The fixations used in this experiment had different
properties compared to the fixations used in the pre-
vious experiment. Three fixation points were used,
one in the centre of the road approximately 16.1 m
ahead of the participant, and two either side of the
road, 2 m outside either road edge. These fixation
points were not fixed on the ground, instead their
position was updated on every frame so they main-
tained the same distance in front of the driver. How-
ever, theywere also linked to theworld so if the driver
steered towards the fixation point the angle of gaze
would reduce.
Cognitive Tasks
Three cognitive tasks were used in this experiment,
the Arrow and Number tasks from Experiment 1,
and an additional auditory task (Sound task). This
task was added in order to examine whether steering
control is affected by a cognitive task that does not
require any visual processing. A simple fixation cross
was used to control the location of participants’ gaze
throughout the Sound task, similar to the other tasks.
Participants heard two tones presented sequentially
at different frequencies (eight tones were used rang-
ing from 240 Hz to 590 Hz in 50 Hz increments).
At the end of the trial participants indicated if the
second sound had a higher or lower frequency than
the first. Participants responded in the same way as
in the Number task by pressing the right paddle for
‘higher’ and the left paddle for ‘lower’. The timings
of the Sound task were identical to the Arrow and
Number tasks (see Figure 2) with each sound lasting
for 1 s.
As with Experiment 1, a blocked design was used.
First, participants completed the control conditions
(6 trials of 3 fixations) (No Task 1 block). Then in
the second block the three cognitive tasks were ran-
domly interleaved (6 trials of 3 fixations× 3 tasks). Fi-
nally, they repeated a control block with no cognitive
task (6 trials of 3 fixations) (No Task 2). Conditions
within each block were always randomised and half
of the 6 trials of every condition were right bends
and half of them left bends.
Since participants had to wait until the end of each
trial to respond to the tasks, it is not useful to mea-
sure reaction times for these tasks. Therefore a pilot
studywas conducted using these tasks (with the same
timings as in the actual experiments) but without any
steering. Ten participants (mean age = 21.6 years)
sat in the driving simulator and were presented with
eight trials of each of the three cognitive tasks. Par-
ticipants were asked to respond as quickly and accu-
rately as possible at the onset of the second stimulus.
The reaction times and percent correct results are
shown in Table 1. Two repeated-measures ANOVAs
were conducted, one for reaction times and one for
accuracy. A significant main effect was found on re-
action times, F(2, 18) = 4.99, p = .019, η2p = .36, but
no significant differences were found on the accuracy
scores, F(2, 18) = 1.56, p = .237. Pairwise compar-
isons with LSD adjustment showed that participants
were significantly slower in the Arrow task compared
to the Number task (p = .026); no other differences
were found. The results indicate that although par-
ticipants took more time to make a judgement on
the relative directions of the arrows in the Arrow
task, the three tasks gave similar results in terms of
accuracy.
Table 1 Mean and Standard Deviation of Reaction Times
and Accuracy scores for the three cognitive tasks without
steering.
Reaction Times (s) Accuracy (%)
x¯ SD x¯ SD
Number 0.69 0.14 94.17 10.43
Arrow 1.01 0.47 90.00 8.61
Sound 0.82 0.30 95.00 9.96
Results and Discussion
Cognitive Task Performance
Performance in the three cognitive tasks during the
steering study was assessed using accuracy scores
(i.e., the percentage of correct responses). The accu-
racy scores were analysed using a repeated-measures
ANOVA with three levels. No significant differ-
ence was found between tasks in terms of accuracy,
F(2, 22) = 0.68, p = .516, consistent with the results
obtained without steering (see Table 1). Although
it appears that accuracy scores were lower in Exper-
iment 2 compared to the results with no steering
(Number: mean = 80.09%, SD = 26.95; Arrow: mean
= 73.61%, SD = 26.50; Sound: mean = 75.46%, SD
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= 25.34) this was largely driven by four participants
making incorrect response in approximately half of
the trials. We re-ran all of the following analyses
without these participants and the patterns remained
largely unaffected.
Steering Bias
A 3 (fixation points: Inside, Centre, Outside) by 5
(task conditions: No Task 1, Arrow, Sound, Num-
ber, No Task 2) repeated-measures ANOVA was con-
ducted on the steering bias values. There was a sig-
nificant main effect of Fixation, F(2, 22) = 11.29, p <
.001, η2p = .51, with participants steering towards
their point of gaze (see Figure 7a). There was also a
main effect of Task, F(4, 44) = 3.10, p = .025, η2p =
.22, shown in Figure 7b with a general pattern of
oversteer (i.e., steering towards the inside road edge).
There was no significant interaction between Fixa-
tion and Task, F(8, 88) = .81, p = .593.
The main effect of Fixation on steering bias was
examined using planned contrasts. A significant dif-
ference was found between the Outside and Central
fixations, F(1, 11) = 15.54, p = .002, but no signifi-
cant difference was found between the Central and
Inside fixations, F(1, 11) = 0.78, p = .397. This pat-
tern is similar to the steering behaviour exhibited in
Kountouriotis et al. (2012), and can be explained by
the tendency of drivers to oversteer when negotiat-
ing bends (as observed in Wilkie et al., 2010; Raw,
Kountouriotis, Mon-Williams, & Wilkie, 2012).
The significant main effect of Task (Figure 7b)
was analysed using pairwise comparisons with Sidak
correction. The only significant difference was be-
tween the No Task 1 and Sound conditions, p =
.047. Across all fixation conditions, participants over-
steered more in the Sound condition compared to
the No Task 1 condition where they stay closer to the
centre of the road.
The fact that no significant interaction was found
between Task and Fixation conditions indicates that
gaze had a similar effect across the Task conditions.
This does not match the predictions of attention
load models of cognition. There appears to be no
‘tunnelling effect’ (reduced UFOV) in this experi-
ment. However, in order to draw any firm conclu-
sions on the effect of the cognitive tasks on steer-
ing these results have to be examined along with
other steering metrics, namely RMS steering error
and steering reversals.
RMS Steering Error
A 3 (fixation points) by 5 (task conditions) repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted for the RMS steer-
ing error. There was no significant main effect of
Fixation, F(2, 22) = 2.52, p = .103, no significant
main effect of Task, F(2.22, 24.43) = 0.926, p = .458,
and no significant interaction between Fixation and
Task conditions, F(8, 88) = 1.73, p = .103.
These findings are in contrast to Experiment 1,
where in the Arrow and Number conditions partici-
pants had lower RMS errors compared to theNoTask
conditions. The differences between the two experi-
ments were the inclusion of an auditory task in Exper-
iment 2, the wider road, and the different properties
of the fixation points. There is no reason to assume
that including a third task would lower participants’
RMS errors in the other two tasks. The wider road
used should in theory increase RMS errors overall
(because road-edges are moved further into periph-
eral vision, see Robertshaw & Wilkie, 2008; Koun-
touriotis et al., 2012), but also it should allow for
more variation in RMS errors and thus accentuate
any differences between task conditions that could
have been missed in narrower roads. Instead, we
believe that reduced errors may be due to the nature
of gaze fixation in this task. The fixations used in
this experiment biased steering trajectories towards
the direction of participants’ gaze, and that reduced
the gaze angle offset. When the fixations are set at a
constant offset angle from the participants (like in
Experiment 1), the gaze angle is never reduced. If par-
ticipants steer in the direction of gaze the offset gaze
angle does not close down, and the more they steer
towards the fixation point, the more this trajectory
moves away from the centre of the road. Therefore,
drivers seemed to develop a strategy (described in Ex-
periment 1) to mitigate the adverse effects of steering
indefinitely towards their fixation point. This strat-
egy is potentially the reason why there is a difference
in RMS steering error between the Task conditions
in Experiment 1.
Steering Reversals
Given the strong link between RMS steering error
and steering wheel reversals observed in Experi-
ment 1, no differences are expected in the number of

































Figure 7 Steering Bias results for Experiment 2. Positive values indicate oversteer trajectories that cut closer to the
inside of the bend than the middle of the road. (a) The main effect of fixation collapsed across Task conditions, whereby
participants steer more towards the inside of the bend, when the fixation point is positioned beyond the inside edge of
the road. (b) The main effect of Task collapsed across fixation conditions. Participants oversteer more in the Sound task
compared to No Task 1. Error bars = SEM.
reversals in the different task conditions, similar to
the non-significant findings in RMS steering error in
this experiment. Indeed, the 5-level (No Task 1, Ar-
row, Number, Sound, No Task 2) repeated-measures
ANOVA used to analyse the steering reversals in
this experiment showed no significant effect of Task,
F(1.90, 20.99) = 0.54, p = .707. In fact, participants
made almost no steering reversals as defined in the
previous experiment: the average reversals (across
3 fixations, 6 trials each) for No Task 1 was 0.02, for
Number 0.03, for Arrow 0.03, for Sound 0.04, and for
No Task 2 0.02. In Experiment 1, the lowest number
of reversals was 0.30 in the Arrow condition (see Fig-
ure 6).This lack of steering reversals is probably due
to the different fixation points used here, as discussed
above.
By using offset fixations where the driver could
reduce the offset of the gaze angle – by steering closer
to the fixation point – the steering task seems to have
been easier compared to Experiment 1 where the off-
set gaze angle could never be reduced. This could be
the reason for the lack of an effect of concurrent tasks
in Experiment 2. These results indicate that looking
on a point in the world (and not on an in-vehicle
information system) may result in better steering.
General Discussion
Our research examined the effects of a number of
cognitive tasks on steering. Unlike previous work,
we recorded steering along a set of bending road-
ways when gaze direction was controlled in task and
no-task conditions. When ‘road sign’ fixations were
used (fixed position relative to the road) participants
steered towards the direction of their gaze, a find-
ing in line with the Active Gaze model of steering
(Wilkie et al., 2008). When a cognitive load was
added the bias towards the fixation point did not in-
crease; higher bias towards the point of gazewould in-
dicate that other sources of visual information (such
as road-edges or retinal flow) are being weighted less
(Kountouriotis et al., 2012; Wilkie & Wann, 2003). It
appears that the overall processing of the scene did
not alter with the addition of cognitive load since
participants were largely unaffected by the different
cognitive task conditions in terms of steering bias
as well as steering variability. However, when IVIS
fixations were used (fixed position relative to the ve-
hicle), participants had lower RMS steering error
under the cognitive load conditions. This seems to
indicate that the direction of gaze can interact with
cognitive load and influence the resources available
to steer. Our fixation points in Experiment 1 resem-
bled IVIS displays, but similar properties can be seen
in head-up displays (HUDs) in terms of the constant
angle to the driver regardless of the trajectory they
take. One crucial difference is that HUDs can dis-
play information in front of the driver rather than
requiring them to turn their head towards an IVIS
which is preferable since it does not take gaze away
from the scene and potential hazards. One possible
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limitation of this method of displaying information
is that during bend negotiation a HUD would direct
gaze towards the direction of instantaneous heading
rather than the drivers’ future path. It is not safe
to assume that such shifts in gaze are safe, and fur-
ther experiments are needed in order to clarify any
detriments/improvements in driving behaviour as-
sociated with HUDs.
It should be highlighted that it is currently un-
clear why RMS error and steering reversals decrease
when a cognitive load is added to the steering task.
Macdonald and Hoffmann (1980) attempted to ex-
plain the negative relationship between concurrent
task difficulty and reversal rates in terms of partici-
pants removing attention from the steering task. If
participants fail to attend the steering task then fewer
corrective steering adjustments would be made (and
so fewer reversals). In line with this, Jamson and
Merat (2005) found that as the demands of a con-
current auditory task increased, lane variation (a
measure similar to RMS error) decreased. It should
be noted that lane variation actually increased dur-
ing their ‘visual task’, but this may have simply been
caused by head and eye movements sampling infor-
mation from the screen presenting the visual task
(the display was placed in the car in front of the radio
control panels). Medeiros-Ward et al. (2014) argue
that the reduction in steering variability under con-
ditions of cognitive load is due to positive effects on
performance of highly-automated tasks that do not
require (and in fact will be impaired by) attention.
One difficulty with interpreting a low reversal rate
is that this measure merely reflects few steering ad-
justments. In some cases this could be because of a
lack of response to steering errors, but it could also
be because there is simply no need tomake a steering
adjustment (i.e. steering performance is not errorful
in the first place). To try to address this in our experi-
ment reversals were defined as peaks in the opposite
direction of the required steering response; in the
literature, however, reversals can be defined as peaks
in any direction3. Without comparing trajectories
with the optimal steering line it can be difficult to
draw firm conclusions from steering reversals. In the
present experiments, participants were instructed to
3When reversals are defined in this way, it is very hard to
distinguish between genuine reversals which adjust the steering
course and variability in the steering response or, indeed, from
simply unwanted noise.
stay in the centre of the road in order to be able to
extract a useful measure of steering error and bias.
Steering bias shows that trajectories were influenced
by the point of gaze. We also found that the steer-
ing system is sufficiently flexible that participants
can learn to steer away from the direction of fixation
in order to bring visual information about the road
towards central vision.
In Experiment 1, the effect of the two tasks on
steering performance was similar. These results are
in contrast to those of other studies (e.g., Engström
et al., 2005; Jamson & Merat, 2005) where steering
performance was differentially affected by visual and
cognitive load. One explanation for this contradic-
tion may be the differences in gaze patterns across
experiments. In previous work the visual tasks re-
quired gaze to be directed to a separate display and
away from the road. In contrast the present experi-
ments controlled gaze direction and we observed no
differences in steering performance between differ-
ent task conditions. Future studies in the area should
take into account that differences in eye-movements
between cognitive and visual task conditions might
mediate any differences observed in steering perfor-
mance.
In Experiment 2 offset fixations systematically bi-
ased steering, but the biases were not mediated by
cognitive load; this finding suggests that there wasn’t
narrowing of the UFoV. The fixations used in Exper-
iment 2 biased participants towards the direction
of their gaze, which in turn reduced the angle of
gaze. When the fixations were set at a constant ec-
centricity relative to the driver (Experiment 1), the
angle could not be reduced. As such, it could be
argued that the steering task in Experiment 1 was
generally more challenging than in Experiment 2
and this could account for differences in the effect
of cognitive tasks on steering. The differences in the
fixation point properties map directly to real-world
examples: information can be presented inside ve-
hicles (for example in in-vehicle displays), in which
case the driver cannot close down gaze angle, or out-
side of vehicles, for example road-signs, where gaze
angle is not constant. Our data suggest that informa-
tion presented on road signs may interfere less with
steering, particularly if positioned in the direction
you wish to travel. There are additional good reasons
why looking away from your future path while driv-
ing formore than a few seconds poses increased risks
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in driver safety. For example, Liang, Lee, and Horrey
(2014) in a large naturalistic driving study found that
drivers looked away more from their future path in
the seconds preceding a crash or a near miss. They
argued that looking away from your future path for
more than 1.7 seconds poses a risk hazard (Liang et
al., 2014).
In conclusion, we have shown that gaze direction
is a critically important factor in successful steering
control. Concurrent cognitive tasks can have an ef-
fect on steering around bends, but this is dependent
on the demands placed upon gaze and steering. We
found no differences in steering performance across
different cognitive tasks, presumably because we con-
trolled for the direction of participants’ gaze. Addi-
tionally, we have shown that gaze direction towards
a point similar to an in-vehicle information system
makes drivers more susceptible to cognitive interfer-
ence as measured by reduced RMS error rates.
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